尼古拉斯·格沃斯德夫：与俄罗斯的对抗和美国的大战略

The Confrontation with Russia and US Grand Strategy

BOTTOM LINE

基本论点

The United States no longer views cooperation with Russia as a possibility and is now focused on knocking Russia out of the ranks of the great powers.

美国不再将与俄罗斯合作视为一种可能性，现在正专注于将俄罗斯从大国行列中剔除。

Reducing Russian capabilities is more important than forestalling further cooperation between Russia and China.

减少俄罗斯的能力比阻止俄罗斯和中国之间的进一步合作更重要。

Ukraine is now a central priority for American strategy and is no longer ancillary to the larger US-Russia relationship.

乌克兰现在是美国战略的中心优先事项，不再是更大的美俄关系的附属。

Over the past year, two understated but dramatic shifts in US strategy have taken place: the United States no longer seeks to prioritize cooperation with Russia and no longer expects to forestall greater Russia-China cooperation. Support for Ukraine becomes critical as part of an overall strategy designed to degrade Russian capabilities. These developments will, in turn, shape and constrain the options available to the United States over the next decade.

在过去的一年里，美国战略发生了两个低调但戏剧性的转变：美国不再寻求优先考虑与俄罗斯的合作，也不再期望阻止俄中加强合作。作为旨在削弱俄罗斯能力的总体战略的一部分，对乌克兰的支持变得至关重要。这些事态进展将反过来影响和限制美国在未来十年的挑选。

For the past thirty years, US policy towards Russia has toggled back and forth between the hope that a post-Soviet Russia could become a near-peer partner to the United States, and concerns about Russia’s ability to raise costs for and frustrate US preferences for Europe and the Middle East. The effort to “reset” US-Russia relations during the first term of the Obama administration took place against the backdrop of Ukrainian elections that brought Viktor Yanukovych to power in Kyiv, and his efforts to balance between Ukraine’s desire for greater economic integration with Europe and reassuring Russia on its security agenda.

在过去的三十年里，美国对俄罗斯的政策在希望后苏联时代的俄罗斯能够成为美国的近邻伙伴，以及担心俄罗斯有能力为欧洲和中东增加成本并挫败美国的偏好之间来回切换。奥巴马政府第一任期内“重启”美俄关系的努力是在乌克兰选举的背景下进行的，乌克兰选举使维克托·亚努科维奇在基辅掌权，他努力在乌克兰与欧洲进一步经济一体化的愿望和让俄罗斯放心其安全议程之间取得平稳。

When the 2014 Maidan Revolution provided a popular rejection of Yanukovych’s regime, the Obama effort to reset relations became unsustainable. In response to a renewed push for Western integration on the part of the post-Yanukovych Ukrainian governments, Vladimir Putin resorted to outright force to seize control of Crimea and foment uprisings in southeastern Ukraine designed to destabilize the country and force its federalization. From this point onward, the US-Russia partnership became politically untenable.

当2014年的迈丹革命让民众一般拒绝亚努科维奇政权时，奥巴马重启两国关系的努力变得不可连续。作为对后亚努科维奇时代乌克兰政府再次推动西方一体化的回应，弗拉基米尔·普京采取了彻底的武力夺取克里米亚的操纵权，并在乌克兰东南部煽动起义，旨在破坏国家稳定，迫使其联邦化。从这一点开始，美俄伙伴关系在政治上变得站不住脚。

Yet, during the last years of the Obama administration, the Trump administration, and into the first year of the Biden administration, Russia policy was stuck between those advocating a more robust pushback against a “revisionist” Kremlin—with Russia now identified as a “great power” competitor of the United States—and those seeking to find ways to manage competition and limit confrontation, on the grounds that Washington needed to be able to focus more of its attention on Iran and China. As the United States intensified sanctions pressure on Tehran, for instance, it quietly accepted that Russian energy would fill the gaps, even if it meant strengthening the resources at Moscow’s disposal. And Russia was still seen as a necessary partner in any long-term coalition meant to balance the rise of China.

然而，在奥巴马政府、特朗普政府的最后几年，以及拜登政府的第一年，俄罗斯政策被夹在主张对“修正主义”克里姆林宫进行更有力反击的人和寻求治理竞争和限制对抗的人之间，前者认为俄罗斯现在被认定为美国的“大国”竞争对手，后者认为华盛顿需要能够将更多注意力集中在伊朗和中国身上。例如，随着美国加强对德黑兰的制裁压力，它悄悄地接受了俄罗斯能源将填补空白的事实，即使这意味着要加强莫斯科可支配的资源。

俄罗斯仍旧被视为任何旨在平稳中国崛起的长期联盟中的必要伙伴。

Russia’s open invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, has brought the debate to an end. Even with no formal statement of policy, the policy signals are quite clear: the United States no longer believes it is possible to either move forward on any agenda of partnership with Russia, at least under Putin, and that a Russia that continues to wield a mix of hard, soft and sharp power capabilities creates obstacles for the United States. Thus, the United States, via sanctions, trade policy, financial instruments, and outright military support for Ukraine, is seeking to degrade Russian tools of statecraft. If Russia cannot be, from Washington’s perspective, a near-peer partner, then it must be reduced to the status of a non-peer competitor.

然而，俄罗斯于2022年2月公开入侵乌克兰，结束了这场辩论。即使没有正式的政策声明，政策信号也相当明确：

美国不再认为有可能在与俄罗斯的任何伙伴关系议程上取得进展，至少在普京的领导下是这样，而且一个继续拥有硬、软、锐实力的俄罗斯会给美国制造障碍。

因此，美国通过制裁、贸易政策、金融工具和对乌克兰的直接军事支持，试图削弱俄罗斯的治国工具。

从华盛顿的角度来看，如果俄罗斯不能成为一个近乎对等的伙伴，那么它就必须沦为非对等竞争对手。

Reducing Russia’s great-power capabilities also takes priority over preventing or disincentivizing a closer entente between Moscow and Beijing. In essence, the United States is prepared to accept that China may gain a temporary boost from having additional, low-cost access to Russian natural resources (and that Beijing can offer a partial lifeline to maintain Moscow’s position). The gamble is that the long-term degradation of Russian capabilities will reduce the level of support Beijing might be able to expect from its partnership with Moscow.

减少俄罗斯的大国能力也比阻止或抑制莫斯科和北京之间更紧密的关系更重要。

从本质上讲，美国准备接受中国可能会从获得额外的、低成本的俄罗斯自然资源中获得临时的提振（北京可以提供部分生命线来维持莫斯科的地位）。

赌注在于，俄罗斯能力的长期退化将降低北京可能从其与莫斯科的伙伴关系中获得的支持水平。

In addition to trying to reduce Russia’s overall levels of national power, the United States also appears to be committing to the long-term renovation of the Ukrainian state. The level of military, economic, and financial support to Kyiv moves beyond a more limited mission set of weakening Russian capabilities in favor of constructing Ukraine as a 21st–century

front-line state

against a Russia now deemed to be implacably hostile—and for this renovated Ukraine to acquire a set of capabilities akin to those possessed by South Korea, Taiwan, or Israel. In other words, a Ukraine that can sustain an impressive degree of military and technological capability and have the economic base to support its position.

除了试图降低俄罗斯的总体国力水平，美国似乎还致力于乌克兰国家的长期复兴。对基辅的军事、经济和财政支持水平超出了削弱俄罗斯能力这一更为有限的任务范畴，有利于

将乌克兰建设成21世纪的前线国家

，以对抗现在被认为是无情敌对的俄罗斯，并使这个经过改造的乌克兰获得一系列类似于韩国、**或以色列拥有的能力。换言之，乌克兰能够保持令人印象深刻的军事和技术能力，并拥有支持其地位的经济基础。

While the Biden administration may not openly be endorsing former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s “Three Lighthouses” approach, the idea is that Ukraine’s importance to the United States will increase as it is expected to serve as the anchor of the Euro-Atlantic world’s eastern bulwark (as Israel does for the Middle East and Taiwan for East Asia). With the recent release of Japan’s new national security strategy, and the related defense white paper envisioning a web of partnerships to connect the Indo-Pacific basin with the Euro-Atlantic region, and identifying the defense of Ukraine as central to this effort, Ukraine is moving to assume a more central role in geopolitics and as part of US and allied efforts to contain the China challenge independent of how this might impact US relations with Moscow.

虽然拜登政府可能不会公开支持

前国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥的“三灯塔”做法

From George H.W. Bush to the first year of Joe Biden’s presidency, US policy tried to balance Ukraine’s desire for closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic world with preserving a cooperative relationship with Moscow. In his meetings with both Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin in summer 2021, Biden attempted to manage this balancing act. Putin’s decision to launch the “special military operation” in February 2022 has brought this effort to a close.

从乔治·H·W·布什到乔·拜登担任总统的第一年，美国的政策试图平稳乌克兰与欧洲-大西洋世界建立更紧密关系的愿望与保持与莫斯科的合作关系。在2021年夏天与泽连斯基和普京的会晤中，拜登试图治理这种平稳行为。普京决定在2022年2月发起“特别军事行动”，这一努力就此结束。

American support for Ukraine and the concurrent effort to weaken Russian capabilities outweigh any possible benefits the United States might receive from a cooperative relationship with Moscow, and the risks of a closer Russia-China entente are less pressing than containing Russia’s efforts to forcibly modify the post-Cold War order. The United States is now gambling that knitting together a coalition of its European and Asian partners to thwart Russian ambitions in Ukraine will translate into an enduring coalition that can contain and limit China’s revisionism down the line.

美国对乌克兰的支持以及削弱俄罗斯能力的同时努力，超过了美国可能从与莫斯科的合作关系中获得的任何可能的好处，而且与遏制俄罗斯强行修改冷战后秩序的努力相比，俄罗斯与中国达成更紧密协议的风险没有那么紧迫。美国现在正在赌一把，将其欧洲和亚洲伙伴组成的联盟，挫败俄罗斯在乌克兰的野心，将转化为一个持久的联盟，从而遏制和限制中国的修正主义。

Nikolas Gvosdev is the Director of the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and Editor of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs.

The Confrontation with Russia and US Grand Strategy

https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/02/the-confrontation-with-russia-and-us-grand-strategy/