诺奖经济学家：为什么特朗普会输掉贸易战。Krugman：Why Trump Will Lose His Trade War

“His people don’t know what they’re doing or what they want”

“他的团队不知道该做什么！需要什么！”

4月16日， 诺奖经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼在 Substack平台发表文章，批评特朗普近期出台的关于贸易、关税等一系列政策，并且预测特朗普政府会输掉与中国的贸易战。

保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul R. Krugman）， 美国经济学家。 2008年获诺贝尔经济学奖。克鲁格曼的主要研究领域包括国际贸易、国际金融、货币危机与汇率变化理论。

在文章中，克鲁格曼认为懂王和他的团队根本就不懂国际贸易，开门见山直述核心逻辑——国际贸易的核心不在于什么你能卖，而是你能买到什么。

克鲁格曼功成名就的经济学研究方向是国际贸易，也算是偏向自由派的经济学专家，他就不可能和川王尿一壶里吗？

克鲁格曼对于川王的“U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.”——“贸易谈判孤立中国的计划”，并不认为这个计划能够成功。他给出了四个原因，我以自己的理解简要归纳罗列：

1、政治儿戏化，通过社交媒体发布政策，前后不一致或自我否定。

2、孤立中国非一国之力，需要它国同进退，但川王政府让美国国际声誉落地，人家未必跟随。

3、即便川王可信，从自身利益角度出发，欧盟也不会得罪中国破坏自己的供应链。

4、交易的核心在进口而非出口，出口的损失中国政府可以通过扩大内需弥补，但美国损失的关键进口品却很难弥补。同时，有一方不用面临选举的压力。

所以，克鲁格曼认为，川王对抗中国是蚍蜉撼树，不对称的战争

而更深层次的，克鲁格曼从制度经济学的角度，阐述了美国为什么在世界范围内失去信任，是因为目前美国的政治制度正在迈向独裁，这个世界上广泛的民主体制价值观，背道而驰。因此现在没有国家愿意和美国结盟。

所以，文章段末的“collapse of democracy”并不是指民主制度本身的崩塌，而是指的美国的政治制度正在转向。

当然，克鲁格曼本身就是一个“大喇叭”，对于贸易战，他不看好川王政府，并不意味着他就看好中国。比如去年他也发表了一篇文章“唱空”中国经济，认为中国经济模式不可持续，尤其是高投资带动的经济发展，未来应该转型为以消费为主的模式。

他也曾经写文章质疑过中国经济的未来发展：

“中国经济面对目前的困境，最显而易见的解决办法是将更多收入转移到家庭，从生产端转移到消费端，增加居民收入从而增强消费需求。 但中国似乎奇怪地不愿做这些显而易见的事情，仍然专注于大量生产而非消费 。 ”

当时，国内也有很多经济学专家批评他，其实平心而论，他对于中国的看法和预测，更多是基于他的经济学理念，而非政治身份和意识形态。甚至关于中国经济在投资和消费方面的，其实也是有一定的逻辑和道理。

因此，我们可以通过克鲁格曼的这篇文章，从第三方的视角，来审视这场由特朗普发起的贸易战“闹剧”的未来走势。

以下，为英文原文及翻译：

Scenes from the trade war:

In response to Donald Trump’s huge tariffs on Chinese exports, China’s government has suspended exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, both critical to many modern industries and the military

Trade talks between the United States and the European Union appear to have gone nowhere, with Maros Sefcovic, the EU’s top trade official, reportedly having “struggled to determine America’s aims.”

贸易战的场景：

针对唐纳德·特朗普对中国出口商品征收高额关税，中国政府已暂停出口稀土矿物和磁铁，这两种物质对众多现代产业和军事领域都至关重要。

据报道，美国和欧盟之间的贸易谈判似乎毫无进展，欧盟首席贸易官员马罗什·谢夫乔维奇“难以确定美国的目标”。

In other words, the Chinese, unlike the Trump administration, understand what trade and trade wars are about. And the Trumpers, in addition to not knowing what they’re doing, don’t even know what they want.

换句话说，中国与特朗普政府不同，他们明白贸易以及贸易战是怎么回事。而特朗普政府除了不知道自己在做什么之外，甚至都不清楚自己想要什么。

Here’s what Trump and his sycophants don’t understand about international trade: It’s not about what you can sell, it’s about what you can buy.

特朗普及其他的马屁精，对国际贸易一窍不通：国际贸易的核心逻辑不在于你能卖什么，而在于你能买什么。

Think for a minute about the finances of individuals. Why do people work? Not to be able to boast that they ran trade surpluses with their employers — “Hey, they paid me a lot, and I hardly bought anything from them.” No, people sell their labor so that they can afford to buy stuff.

思考一下我们的个人财务。人们为什么要工作呢？不是为了吹嘘自己作为劳动者和老板之间的“贸易顺差”——“嘿，老板们付给了我相当多的薪酬，然而我们却没有从他们那里买任何东西”。人们出售自己的劳动力，是为了购买商品。

The same is true for countries. Importing what you want — being able to get stuff from other countries — is the purpose of international trade. Exporting — sending stuff to other countries — is something we do so we can pay for imports.

国家之间的道理同样如此。进口你所需要的——能够从其他国家购买商品——这是国际贸易的目的。出口——卖给其他国家（得到外汇）——这样我们才能够购买进口商品。

OK, in practice there’s a bit more to the story, as I’ll explain below, but the complications don’t change the fundamental proposition that the benefits from international trade basically come from being able to import goods that would be expensive or impossible to produce at home. Think hydroelectric power from Canada.

当然，现实中的贸易比理论要复杂，我将在下文进行的解释。然而，不管再复杂，其基本逻辑是没有变的，即国际贸易的好处是，能够进口昂贵，或者是不能在国内生产的商品。 想想来自加拿大的水力发电。

This fundamental reality explains why serious analyses of Trump’s trade war with China often conclude that China, not America, has the upper hand.

这一基本现实解释了，为什么那些关于特朗普与中国的贸易战的严肃分析，往往得出的结论是，中国，而不是美国，占了上风。

Yesterday the Financial Times had a mostly good writeup of the stakes, which pointed out that US exports to China are “heavily focused on agriculture.” The FT said that these goods are “low value-added,” which I’m not sure is true — U.S. farming is highly productive and highly capital-intensive. But what matters in a trade war is the fact that China can fairly easily find other agricultural suppliers, buying soybeans from Brazil instead of Iowa.

昨天，《金融时报》对利害关系进行了大量报道，指出美国对中国的出口“主要集中在农业上”。 英国《金融时报》表示，这些商品是“低附加值”的，我不确定这是真的——美国农业生产力高，资本密集型高。 但在贸易战中，重要的是，中国可以很容易地找到其他农业供应商，从巴西购买大豆替代从爱荷华州。

By contrast, the United States will have a hard time replacing many of the goods it imports from China. Furthermore, many of the goods we buy from China are industrial inputs rather than consumer goods.

相比之下，美国将很难找到原本从中国进口商品的替代品。 此外，我们从中国购买的许多商品都是工业投入，而不是消费品。

So Trump has started a trade war that will disrupt our own supply chains. Remember Covid and its immediate aftermath? Remember how shortages spread through the economy and fueled inflation? Those days are about to come back, inflicting especially large damage on the manufacturing sector Trump claims he will revive.

因此，特朗普发动了一场贸易战，这将扰乱我们自己的供应链。还记得新冠肺炎及其直接后果吗？ 还记得短缺是如何在经济中蔓延和助长通货膨胀的吗？ 那些日子即将卷土重来，尤其是对特朗普声称他将复兴的制造业，将造成了特别大的损害。

Is the U.S. economy at China’s mercy? No. America remains a highly productive nation that could cope with even severe economic shocks if it had smart, clear-headed leadership. But we don’t.

美国经济受中国摆布吗？不。美国仍然是一个生产力强国，甚至能够应对严重的经济冲击。但前提是这个国家领导者具备聪明、清醒的头脑。但我们没有。

True, today’s Wall Street Journal has an article with the headline “U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.” So you might think that there’s an actual strategy out there. But I don’t believe it, for four reasons.

诚然，今天的《华尔街日报》有一篇标题为“美国计划利用贸易谈判来孤立中国”的文章。所以你可能会认为有一个切实的政策落地。但我并不相信，主要有四个原因。

First, this story was clearly leaked by Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, or people close to him. In a normal administration this kind of supposedly inside scoop would offer valuable insights into the policy process. But one thing that’s clear about Trump tariffs is that there is no policy process. Individual officials — Bessent, Peter Navarro, Howard Lutnick — keep floating policy ideas in public, hoping that putting them out there will somehow create facts. But a day or two later another official will go on TV, or Trump will post something on Truth Social, completely contradicting what the last official said.

第一，这个故事显然是由财政部长斯科特·贝森特或他身边的人泄露的。 在正常政府中，这种所谓的内幕消息将为政策过程提供宝贵的见解。但问题是特朗普的关税政策的制定根本就没有一个正常的流程。别官员——贝森特、彼得·纳瓦罗、霍华德·卢特尼克——一直在公共场合传播政策想法，希望将它们放在那里会以某种方式创造事实。 但一两天后，另一位官员将上电视，或者特朗普将在Truth Social上发布一些东西，这与上一位官员的说法完全矛盾。

So what we’re hearing about Bessent isn’t really a scoop about Trump policy, it’s almost surely an attempt by Bessent to influence policy. And there’s no reason to believe that he’s actually in charge.

因此，我们听到的关于贝森特的信息并不是关于特朗普政策的独家新闻，几乎可以肯定这是贝森特影响政策的企图。没有理由相信他真的是负责人。

Second, even if U.S. negotiators are trying to cut deals with other countries that would isolate China, they will be unlikely to succeed because Trump has lost all credibility. After all, you can’t make deals with other countries unless foreign governments believe that you will honor the agreements you make. Trump has already destroyed U.S. credibility on that front, ripping up all our existing trade agreements, then making wild changes in his own tariffs every few days.

第二，即使美国谈判代表试图与其他国家达成孤立中国的协议，他们也不太可能成功，因为特朗普已经失去了所有的信誉。毕竟，除非外国政府相信你会遵守你达成的协议，否则你不能与其他国家达成协议。特朗普已经破坏了美国在这方面的信誉，撕毁了我们现有的所有贸易协议，然后每隔几天就大幅改变自己的关税。

Third, even if Trump’s promises were credible, why would a European government want to join America’s trade war with China, destroying its own supply chains? If the argument is that it’s worth paying the cost of ruined supply chains because that will protect you from Trump’s tariffs, who trusts Trump not to reimpose punitive tariffs on our supposed allies the next time he thinks they’re looking at him funny?

第三，即使特朗普的承诺是可信的，欧洲政府为何要加入美国与中国的贸易战，而摧毁自己的供应链呢？ 如果理由摧毁自己的供应链是值得的，因为这将保护自己免受特朗普的关税政策的胁迫，那么当下次他认为欧洲国家在看他笑话的时候，谁会相信特朗普不会对这些所谓的盟友重新征收惩罚性关税？

Fourth, the Trump administration is bringing a knife to a gun fight.

第四，特朗普政府这是在用小刀对抗火枪。

To the extent that there’s a real plan to confront China, it appears to center on reducing China’s ability to sell abroad. It’s true that this will be painful for China’s export sector. As I said, my flat statement that trade is about imports, not exports, needs some qualification because the short-term interests of exporters can’t be ignored. But China can cope with lost exports by aiding affected industries, the same way Trump funneled money to farmers hurt by his first trade war. It can also offset any loss of export jobs by stimulating domestic demand.

在某种程度上，对抗中国行之有效的办法，应集中在削减中国的海外销售能力。这能够切实地给中国出口部门带来痛苦。正如我所说，我自己的浅见——贸易的关键是进口，而非出口，需要一些论证，因为出口商的短期利益不能忽视。但是中国能够通过对受影响的出口行业进行补助来弥补出口缺口，就像第一次贸易战争中特朗普对遭受损失的农民提供流动性资金。可以通过刺激内需来抵消出口工作岗位减少的损失。

So while China can manage the loss of exports in various ways, it will be much harder for America to cope with the loss of crucial inputs produced in China.

因此，虽然中国可以通过各种方式减少出口损失，但美国将更难应对来自中国生产的关键进口商品的损失。

The overall point is that even relatively sophisticated Trumpers like Bessent are still thinking in terms of Chinese access to the markets of the United States and our imagined trade war allies, when the real issue now is whether China can strangle the U.S. economy by disrupting our supply chains.

总体而言，即使是像贝森特这样相对老练的特朗普团队成员，仍然在考虑中国进入美国市场和我们想象中的贸易战盟友，而现在真正的问题是中国能否通过扰乱我们的供应链来扼杀美国经济。

PS: I know that I’m mixing metaphors here — China has brought a gun that is strangling us by cutting our supply chains. But you get my point.

PS：我知道我在这里混淆了隐喻——中国带来了一把枪，通过切断我们的供应链来扼杀我们。但你们懂我的意思。

Furthermore, America’s ability to fight a trade war is severely damaged by our descent into authoritarian rule. A few months ago other advanced countries might have been inclined to take our side because of shared democratic values. Now we’ve become a country whose government claims the right to kidnap people whenever it likes and ship them to foreign gulags. Who wants to be allied with such a government? Who will trust such a government to keep its word on anything?

此外，美国打贸易战的能力因我们陷入专制的统治而受到严重损害。几个月前，由于共同的民主价值观，其他发达国家可能倾向于站在我们一边。现在，我们已经成为一个政府声称有权随时绑架人并将他们运往外国“古拉格集中营”的国家。谁愿意与这样的政府结盟？ 谁会相信这样的政府会信守诺言？

Of course, the fact that the collapse of democracy will contribute to our defeat in the trade war isn’t the main reason to be horrified at where we are. Losing real GDP is bad, but it’s much less important than losing our soul. As it happens, however, we seem to be on track to do both.

当然，民主的崩溃将导致我们在贸易战中的失败，这一事实并不是我们对现状感到惊讶的主要原因。失去GDP固然是一件坏事，但失去立国之本更为重要。然而，碰巧的是，这两者正同时发生着。